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VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES TO FEDERAL
AGENCIES-THEIR IMPACT ON THE ABILITY
OF CORPORATIONS TO PROTECT FROM
DISCOVERY MATERIALS DEVELOPED DURING
THE COURSE OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
Richard H. Porter*
In many American corporations, internal investigations are becoming
commonplace. Responsible corporate executives are recognizing that inter-
nal investigations are an essential element in a program of responsible self-
governance. At the same time, some federal agencies have created addi-
tional incentives to conduct internal investigations by encouraging voluntary
disclosures of wrongdoing. At least two agencies have established formal
"voluntary disclosure" programs promising leniency or other benefits if a
corporation discloses irregularities discovered during an internal
investigation. 1
This Article focuses on an important, contemporary legal issue: The abil-
ity of corporations to protect reports and other materials produced during
internal investigations from discovery by third parties when voluntary dis-
closures are made to government agencies. This issue is of increasing con-
cern because other government agencies, former employees, or competitors
intent on suing the corporation may attempt to obtain copies of materials
generated during internal corporate investigations for their own purposes.
Parts I and II of this Article discuss who should conduct an internal cor-
porate investigation and the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine to the investigation. In Parts III and IV, this
Article focuses on structuring the investigation so that the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrines apply, and examines various volun-
tary disclosure programs. In Parts V and VI, this Article analyzes the con-
* Mr. Porter is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Steptoe & Johnson.
Much of his practice involves complex litigation and internal corporate investigations.
1. See infra Part IV for discussion of voluntary disclosure programs established by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD). Guide-
lines currently being considered by the United States Sentencing Commission recognize as
"mitigating factors" disclosures of wrongdoing to government authorities prior to the com-
mencement of a government investigation. Preliminary Draft Sentencing Guidelines for Orga-
nizational Defendants, Nov. 1, 1989, at 7.
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sequences of voluntary disclosures to agencies, and the impact of such
disclosures on the ability of third parties to gain access to documents gener-
ated during internal corporate investigations.
For analytical purposes, assume the following: You are the president and
chief executive officer of a major corporation returning from a long weekend
on Martha's Vineyard. Life is wonderful. Business is good. You broke 70
for the first time on a very tough golf course. Your daughter finished first in
a horse show and your son placed a very respectable second at the club's
annual 14 and under tennis tournament.
On the plane ride home, the following headline in the morning paper
catches your eye: "Agency Official Indicted by Grand Jury." Reading fur-
ther, you find that the branch chief of a federal agency responsible for
awarding government contracts has been indicted for allegedly accepting
gratuities and kickbacks and otherwise subverting the agency's procurement
processes for personal gain. Interesting but not unusual-at least until it
dawns on you that your corporation owns a subsidiary that, over the years,
has received a number of contracts from the federal agency mentioned in the
article. You make a mental note to obtain additional information concern-
ing your subsidiary's dealings with the agency when you return to the office.
Suddenly, Martha's Vineyard seems and feels a long way away.
When you finally reach your office, your worries intensify. You find that
the subsidiary has been surprisingly successful in obtaining contracts from
the agency identified in the newspaper article. In addition, you learn that
the subsidiary's annual billings to the agency are in excess of $1 million. To
complete the good news, your executive assistant notifies you of an anony-
mous note placed in the subsidiary's "suggestion box" several weeks ago.
The note alleges that certain managers and employees of the subsidiary have
engaged in a variety of illegal activities involving the subsidiary's govern-
ment contracts.
The need for some sort of an internal investigation is apparent. Taking no
action and waiting to see what, if anything, will develop is an option, but
contemporary notions of corporate and managerial responsibility counsel
against either an ostrich-like, "head-in-the-sand" approach or a "catch us if
you can" philosophy. Failure on your part to conduct a reasonable inquiry
and to take any necessary corrective action can lead to shareholder deriva-
tive suits.2 In addition, the corporation may soon find itself embroiled in
federal civil and criminal litigation triggered by further investigations con-
2. See, e.g., In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982);
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D.
595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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ducted by the affected agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ), or the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). You may also
find yourself with significant public relations problems if you are unprepared
to respond to press inquiries concerning your subsidiary's involvement with
the federal agency or the indicted official. These compelling considerations
are likely to reinforce your natural inclination to want to find out what, if
anything, happened, and to control future events relating to the problem
that has surfaced.
Let's assume you conclude that an internal investigation must be con-
ducted. The path of self-investigation is not an easy one, and a number of
critical decisions will have to be made fairly quickly. These decisions in-
clude selecting someone to conduct the investigation, determining how to
structure the investigation, clarifying the corporation's intentions with re-
gard to disclosure, and assessing the legal and business implications of mak-
ing a voluntary disclosure. These are difficult decisions which should be
addressed before you start down the internal investigation/voluntary disclo-
sure path. Failure to address these issues and to take appropriate precau-
tions before an investigation is commenced can create circumstances
benefitting potential litigation adversaries and can harm both your corpora-
tion's reputation and its financial interests.
I. WHO SHOULD CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION?
After concluding that an internal investigation is necessary or prudent, the
first step is to select an investigator. Undoubtedly, there are senior manage-
ment personnel who know the subsidiary, are familiar with its government
contracting, and are capable of finding out what happened. Auditors from
your corporate audit department might also be considered for the task. Nev-
ertheless, if the alleged or suspected conduct is likely to raise significant legal
issues, you should ask your law department or outside counsel to conduct
the investigation.
Attorneys are best suited to conduct the investigation because they are
likely to be more sensitive to obscure but significant legal issues which can
arise during an internal investigation.3 Furthermore, there is a compelling
3. A number of difficult ancillary problems requiring legal judgments can arise during an
internal investigation. For example, if individual employees appear to be acting illegally and in
a manner inconsistent with established corporate policies, the employees may require separate
counsel, thus complicating the investigation. Document preservation obligations may arise
requiring modification of the corporation's "records retention" policies. And, as discussed in
this Article, insensitivity to confidentiality and other requirements can lead to the waiver of
legal privileges that might otherwise serve to protect documents developed during the investi-
gation from discovery by third parties.
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practical reason why the investigation should not be conducted by manage-
ment personnel: It is highly unlikely that documents generated during an
investigation conducted by managerial personnel can be shielded from dis-
covery by third parties.4
The general rule in federal civil litigation is that a party may obtain dis-
covery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action."'  Typically, the discovery rule is
applied broadly.6 Privileges that might be asserted to block discovery are
few in number and are narrowly construed.7 Unfortunately, there is no gen-
erally recognized privilege that will protect the fruits of an internal investiga-
tion conducted by management. Commentators have argued for the
creation of a privilege to protect self-critical corporate analyses,' and some
courts have denied discovery requests for reports of internal investigations,
partly to avoid discouraging such investigations.9 Notwithstanding the
praise some courts have bestowed on corporations that have conducted in-
ternal investigations, however, it is unlikely that a corporation will be able to
resist successfully the discovery of materials generated during the course of
4. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1979) (materials pre-
pared during an internal investigation conducted by management not protected); cf In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (protection afforded to documents submitted to or
prepared by a special officer that had been retained by the corporation to implement an SEC
consent decree).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973); FDIC v.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 84 F.R.D. 345, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re Penn Central Commercial
Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
7. Privileges are narrowly construed because they are viewed as impeding the "full and
free discovery of the truth." Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647
F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981). As a consequence, they are "strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits." In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing
VIII J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); accord United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th
Cir. 1984); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
8. See Leonard, An Emerging Privilege For Self-Critical Analysis, 15 LITIGATION 3
(Spring 1988).
9. See, e.g., Meredith, 572 F.2d at 610 (protection of documents generated during an
internal investigation "will encourage corporations to seek out and correct wrongdoing in their
own house"); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 619 (N.D. Tex 1981) ("[C]orporations will
be less willing to engage in... self-investigation if the results of such an investigation can be
discovered in parallel civil litigation."); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 11,095, at 5071 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (compelling disclosure of findings of internal
investigations may inhibit future candid evaluations); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,659, at 6796 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (internal policy decisions insulated
from discovery partially to encourage internal investigations); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.,
53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (allowing plaintiffs to obtain results of internal investigations
would undermine public policy of encouraging internal evaluations).
[Vol. 39:10071010
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an internal investigation, unless the attorney-client privilege or the attorney
work product doctrine applies. Neither will apply unless the investigation is
conducted or supervised by attorneys.
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE TO INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS
The discussion below addresses the practical and other implications of
voluntary disclosures, including the extent to which such disclosures may
"waive" the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.1° The
elements of the attorney-client and work product privileges have been ex-
haustively discussed in various articles and monographs.11 Therefore, for
present purposes, a brief review of the character and elements of each privi-
lege should suffice.
The attorney-client privilege serves an important public purpose. It en-
courages "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice."12 The protection provided by the privilege is "ab-
solute." No showing of need or hardship by parties seeking discovery of
documents protected by the privilege will be sufficient to compel
disclosure. 13
The elements of the attorney-client privilege were summarized by Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privi-
lege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or
his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
10. See infra discussion in Part V.
11. An excellent general discussion of both privileges and the relevant case law is found in
Epstein & Martin, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, a Project of
the Trial Evidence Committee of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association
(2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter ABA Privilege Monograph].
12. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); In re Martin Marietta Corp.,
856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
13. See Meredith. 572 F.2d at 601-02; cf Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rub-
ber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 547 (D.D.C. 1970) ("[A]ttorney-client privilege has such an effect
on the full disclosure of the truth that it must be narrowly construed.").
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tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived
by the client.' 4
The work product doctrine, first articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 5 serves a different but equally important pur-
pose. It is designed to balance the needs of the adversary system by preserv-
ing the privacy that an attorney needs to prepare for trial. As the Court
noted in Hickman, an attorney's work product should be protected from
discovery by third parties because:
[M]uch of what is now put down in writing would remain unwrit-
ten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases
for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.
And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served. 1
6
The work product doctrine is now codified in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Subsection (b)(3) of the rule provides in part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable.., and prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative... only upon a showing that the party seek-
ing discovery has substantial need of the materials in the prepara-
tion of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
any other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.' 7
There is no longer any question as to the availability of these privileges to
corporations. That issue was conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court in
Upjohn Co. v. United States. 18 Complications can arise, however, when a
14. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); accord Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Serv., 120
F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Handgards Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926,
929 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
15. 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
16. Id. at 511; accord Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 398; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,
236-40 (1975); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("work product privilege
protects both the attorney-client relationship and a complex of individual interests particular
to attorneys that their clients may not share"); Handgards, Inc., 413 F. Supp. at 930 (doctrine
"is aimed at protecting the effectiveness of a lawyer's trial preparations").
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
18. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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corporation attempts to invoke the privileges. As noted previously, neither
privilege will apply if managerial personnel conduct the investigation. 9
Similarly, materials generated during an investigation conducted by house
counsel will not be protected if the record reveals that the investigation was
conducted primarily for "business" reasons. 20 As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit succinctly stated in In Re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, the participation of a corporation's general counsel in an investigation
"does not automatically cloak the investigation with legal garb.",21 This case
and others recognize that house counsel are frequently called upon to pro-
vide business as well as legal advice. While courts will protect materials
prepared by house counsel for the purpose of providing legal advice to man-
agement, 22 special care is required in structuring investigations and in deter-
mining how and with whom the results of the investigation will be shared.23
To avoid complications that may be encountered when house counsel con-
duct an internal investigation, and to increase the likelihood that the attor-
ney-client and work product privileges will apply, you may wish to retain
outside counsel to conduct the investigation. Apart from privilege consider-
ations, there are several other reasons why a corporation may want to turn
to outside counsel. Many large law firms have had considerable experience
in conducting such investigations. In addition, outside counsel may also be
more familiar with the requirements and expectations of the federal agency
to which any disclosure will have to be made. The credibility of the internal
investigation may also be enhanced if the agency is concerned with the abil-
ity of house counsel to conduct an impartial, objective investigation, particu-
larly one which may focus on the conduct of corporate officers or senior
managers.
19. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 513 (1st Cir. 1986); In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982); Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 524
(N.D. Cal. 1988); Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 206, 212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37-39 (D. Md. 1974).
21. 599 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1979)
22. In Upjohn Co., the Court protected documents generated during an internal investiga-
tion conducted by the corporation's General Counsel from discovery by the Internal Revenue
Service even though the corporation had filed a report with the SEC disclosing questionable
payments to foreign officials. The record established that Upjohn's management asked its
General Counsel to conduct the investigation to provide legal advice to management. Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 394. Equally important, strict confidentiality requirements consistent with mainte-
nance of the privilege were maintained throughout the investigation. Id. at 395.
23. In In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982), the court rejected a corpora-
tion's claim of privilege because the court found that the internal investigation conducted by
the corporation's legal department had been intended, in part, to influence the opinion of un-
derwriters and auditors with respect to a public offering. Id. at 488-89.
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Although retaining outside counsel may increase the likelihood that the
attorney-client and work product privileges will apply, there is no iron-clad
guarantee that documents prepared by an attorney who is not employed by
the corporation will be protected from discovery by third parties. In Os-
terneck v. E. T Barwick Industries, for example, the court permitted discov-
ery of an internal investigation report prepared for Barwick Industries and
the SEC by outside counsel because the attorneys who conducted the investi-
gation and created the report "were employed not for their legal acumen but
for their skill as investigators."24 Further, in In re Sealed Case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found an im-
plied waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges when the
court became convinced that the investigation report, although prepared by
attorneys, did not constitute a full and complete disclosure by the
corporation.25
III. STRUCTURING THE INVESTIGATION TO MAKE THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES APPLICABLE
Privilege issues tend to be fact specific and, as a consequence, are generally
decided on a case-by-case basis.26 As a practical matter, this means that
considerable care should be exercised in structuring the investigation to in-
crease the probability that a court, if confronted with the issue, will conclude
that one or both privileges apply.
For the reasons mentioned above, a corporation may enhance its chances
of invoking successfully the attorney-client and work product privileges if
outside counsel conduct the investigation. Regardless of whether outside
counsel or house counsel conduct the investigation, management's authori-
zation to proceed with the investigation should be reduced to writing. The
authorization should emphasize that management is seeking legal advice and
that attorneys have been asked to conduct the investigation to provide such
advice. All communications between counsel and management relating to
24. 82 F.R.D. 81, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that
the two hundred plus page report prepared by counsel contained only one "legal recommenda-
tion." Id. at 86.
25. 676 F.2d 793, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Janicker v. George Wash. Univ., 94
F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982) ("routine investigation of a possibly resistible claim is not
sufficient to immunize an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business");
SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978) (no privilege attached to com-
munications with special counsel appointed to report on corporation's compliance with SEC
regulations or to statements made by corporate officer outside scope of officer's agency for
corporation).
26. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
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the investigation should be labeled "Attorney-Client Communication" and
should be closely held to avoid inadvertent waiver of the privilege.27 To
reinforce the privilege, attorneys interviewing corporate employees should
advise each employee that the investigation is being conducted to enable
counsel to provide legal advice to management. All interview memoranda
should reflect this advice. Similarly, questionnaires or written requests for
information or data directed to corporate personnel should indicate that the
investigation is being conducted so that counsel can provide legal advice to
management. The bottom line is clear. Counsel conducting the investiga-
tion should take advantage of every opportunity to create a paper trail sup-
porting applicability of the privileges.
Increasingly, lawyers conducting internal investigations need the help of
non-attorneys. Paralegals may assist attorneys in fact gathering and docu-
ment collection. Auditors, accountants, or other professionals with financial
expertise are frequently needed to conduct a full and complete investigation.
Anyone other than an attorney who will be assisting counsel, particularly
non-legal corporate personnel, should be required to sign a confidentiality
agreement. Among other things, the agreement should explicitly state that
the person signing the agreement has been recruited to assist the attorneys
charged with responsibility for conducting the investigation.2" The agree-
ment should also impose confidentiality restrictions consistent with mainte-
nance of the privilege.
As long as the record clearly shows that non-attorneys were not con-
ducting an independent inquiry, the involvement of non-attorneys should
not jeopardize application of the work product doctrine to materials gener-
ated during the internal investigation. Most courts have been willing to pro-
tect documents authored by non-attorneys working under the supervision of
attorneys conducting an investigation.29
27. Confidentiality must be maintained to avoid a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("voluntary breach of confi-
dence or selective disclosure" to obtain tactical advantage will waive the privilege); United
States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d
142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972); Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521
F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
28. -See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973)
("statements to the accountant ... unrelated to the seeking of legal advice" held not privi-
leged); Cote, 456 F.2d at 144; United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
29. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 513 (2d Cir. 1979); Scott Paper
Co. v. Ceilcote Co., 103 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D. Me. 1984); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Harris, 488 F.
Supp. 1019, 1026-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342, 345 (D. Del.
1975).
1990] 1015
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:1007
The key to successful invocation of the work product doctrine is the abil-
ity of the corporation to demonstrate that counsel or persons assisting coun-
sel prepared the documents "with an eye toward litigation."3 ° Litigation
need not have commenced, but it must be clear that the investigation was
initiated in contemplation of litigation. a Clearly the most effective way to
guard against inadvertent loss of the protection offered by the work product
doctrine is to ensure that management's written authorization to proceed
with the investigation identifies, as specifically as possible, the nature of the
litigation that is anticipated. The authorization should also state manage-
ment's expectation that attorneys conducting the investigation should begin
identifying defenses to issues that may be raised if litigation does result.
32
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine provides
only "qualified" protection against discovery initiatives. Thus, a litigation
opponent may be able to discover certain documents prepared by or for at-
torneys if the opponent can demonstrate a substantial need for the docu-
ments and an inability to obtain equivalent materials by other means.3 a As a
consequence, all documents prepared during an internal investigation should
be drafted with a view toward minimizing this risk.
The work product doctrine has been invoked frequently and successfully
to shield from discovery "opinion work product," interview notes, and other
documents that might reveal an attorney's mental processes.34 Judicial deci-
30. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). Courts have interpreted "litigation" as
including various types of adversarial proceedings. See, e.g., Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 635
(7th Cir. 1969) (administrative proceedings considered to be litigation); In re Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 123 F.R.D. 574, 576-77 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (The court rejected the argu-
ment that "on a general proposition ...claims for refund are prepared in anticipation of
litigation" but accepted the refund claim as litigation because "the customers have provided
evidence, unrefuted by Conti, that their claims were filed for the purpose of moving their cases
from the Tax Court to this court."); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
1036, 1051 (D. Del. 1985) (proceedings before the Board of Patent Interferences considered to
be litigation).
31. See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862
(1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979); Fox v. Cal. Sierra
Fin. Serv., 120 F.R.D. 520, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Capitol Serv. Inc., 89
F.R.D. 578, 585-86 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 42 (D.
Md. 1974); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
32. Because the corporation, in support of a voluntary disclosure, may have to provide to
the government agency the report prepared by counsel, the report should not discuss issues
pertaining to possible future litigation.
33. In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th
Cir. 1982); Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1231-32; Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64
F.R.D. 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1231; In re Grand Jury Proceedings,




sions at every level clearly indicate that a much stronger showing of neces-
sity and unavailability is required before opinion work product can be
discovered.35 Some courts have even held that no showing of hardship or
need will be sufficient to warrant the discovery of opinion work product.36
Because documents that include an attorney's mental impressions or profes-
sional judgments are much more likely to be protected than documents that
are largely factual,37 the lesson is clear. Whenever possible, documents gen-
erated by or for attorneys during the course of an internal investigation
should include and reflect impressions and judgments. All such documents
should also be stamped or labeled "Attorney Work Product" and handled in
a confidential manner consistent with an intent to maintain and assert the
privilege.38
To increase the likelihood that the corporation will be able to invoke suc-
cessfully the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine in the
face of discovery requests by third parties, the following steps should be
taken:
1. Management should draft a clear written authorization directing
counsel to undertake the investigation for the purpose of providing legal
advice to management.
2. Management's written authorization should identify and express
appropriate concern with anticipated litigation and should explicitly au-
thorize counsel to explore potential litigation issues and defenses.
3. The written authorization should clearly state that counsel may
retain the services of auditors, accountants, or other non-attorneys who
may be needed to assist counsel with the investigation.
4. Counsel should stamp or label all documents created during the
investigation "Attorney-Client Communication" or "Attorney Work
35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970); Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbour Place Assoc.,
632 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (E.D. Va. 1986).
36. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d at 848.
37. "As a practical matter, the presence of an attorney's mental impressions in the docu-
ment operates to make the document less readily discoverable and raises the quantum of 'sub-
stantial need' and 'undue hardship' that must be shown to obtain the document." ABA
Privilege Monograph, supra note 11, at 142.
38. An appropriate level of "confidentiality" is essential to the maintenance of the work
product privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (4th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1972). The voluntary disclosure of work
product materials to an adversary, but not necessarily to another third party such as a govern-
ment agency, may waive the privilege. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642
F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); American Standard Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443,
446-47 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
19901 1017
Catholic University Law Review
Product," file these documents separately, and handle them in a way
that will protect the applicable privileges against contentions that the
privileges have been waived because of a failure to maintain
confidentiality.
5. All non-attorneys assisting counsel with the investigation should
sign appropriate confidentiality agreements.
6. Care should be taken throughout the investigation to draft docu-
ments in a manner supporting and reinforcing the applicability of the
privileges. For example, interview memoranda should include the
views, impressions, and opinions of the attorneys who conduct the
interviews.
7. Counsel should advise everyone involved in the investigation
concerning the need for confidentiality and should caution those in-
volved about conduct that could lead to the waiver of one or both of the
privileges.
IV. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES AND VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS
Taking our scenario a step further, let us assume that outside counsel were
retained to conduct an investigation relating to the subsidiary's dealings with
the indicted agency official. Assume further that counsel have completed the
investigation and have provided management with a report summarizing
counsel's findings, analyzing the legal implications of the situation, and dis-
cussing various legal recommendations. Overall, the picture is not pretty.
The report reveals that serious improprieties, including bribes, kickbacks,
and other improper conduct, influenced the awarding of several contracts to
the subsidiary.
At this point, the corporation has several options. Management could fire
those involved, strengthen its control systems, and take other internal ac-
tions to ensure that the improper conduct has ceased. A response limited to
internal corrective action, however, is fraught with legal difficulty.39 More-
39. Disclosure of the results of an internal investigation revealing corporate misconduct
may be required by federal securities laws. See, e.g., United States v. Dole, 601 F. Supp. 430
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
Although a failure to report knowledge of a felony is not, without more, a crime, any act that
might be construed as an affirmative concealment could be a misprision of a felony under 18
U.S.C. § 4 (1988). United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 695
(9th Cir. 1968). Other criminal statutes, including the Criminal False Fictitious or Fraudulent
Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988), and the Criminal Fraud and False Statements Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), can also pose threats of criminal liability if a corporation adopts a busi-
ness as usual approach with respect to government contracts that have been tainted by fraud.
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over, a major corporation that discovers significant wrongdoing during the
course of an internal investigation and fails to report the wrongdoing runs a
terrible public relations risk, particularly if the wrongdoing has public inter-
est implications. The last thing any corporate executive needs is an excited
media in pursuit of a story headlined "Management Coverup."
Another option is to make some sort of a "voluntary disclosure" to the
affected federal agency and attempt to work out a solution to the corpora-
tion's problems before the agency or the Department of Justice commences
litigation. As a practical matter, it may be the corporation's only viable op-
tion. Nevertheless, the advantages and disadvantages of a voluntary disclo-
sure should be weighed carefully because any disclosure of illegal activity
will expose the corporation to civil and criminal penalties. Management
will, of course, want to satisfy itself that making a disclosure is consistent
with its fiduciary responsibilities. At the same time, the corporation will
want to receive some benefits in return for its voluntary disclosure and
cooperation.
If the affected federal agency does not have a formal "voluntary disclo-
sure" program, you may be writing on a relatively clean slate. This situation
may work to the corporation's advantage, however, because there may be
more room for negotiation with the agency, with respect to both the best
means of resolving issues raised by the investigation and important ancillary
matters, such as the agency's willingness to protect any voluntary report that
might be filed with the agency from third parties.
Formal voluntary disclosure programs are a fairly recent phenomenon. In
the mid-1970's, when it became apparent that many American corporations
had made questionable payments to facilitate business transactions in foreign
countries, the SEC established a program encouraging corporations to inves-
tigate such payments and report the results to the SEC.' Typically, after
conducting an internal investigation, the corporation would file a report with
the SEC describing in general terms the investigation conducted, manage-
ment's knowledge of any questionable payments, and the impact of the cor-
poration's decision to abandon the payment practice. The nature of the
corporation's voluntary disclosure was sometimes described as "generic":
40. The voluntary disclosure program created by the SEC at that time is discussed at
length in In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE SEC
ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print
1976); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1850-53 (1976); Note, Discovery of Internal Corporate Investigations,
32 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1980) [hereinafter Discovery].
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the disclosures were somewhat general and, for diplomatic reasons, the iden-
tities of the recipients of the payments were not disclosed.4
The SEC's voluntary disclosure program spared the Commission the need
to conduct time-consuming and expensive investigations. The SEC provided
significant incentives to encourage corporations to participate in the pro-
gram. In exchange for making a generic voluntary disclosure and a com-
mittment to abandon the practice, the SEC relieved corporations of the
burden and expense of a formal SEC investigation and possible future litiga-
tion. The Commission also promised "leniency" to corporations participat-
ing in the program; more than 350 major corporations ultimately made
voluntary disclosures to the SEC.42
More recently, the Department of Defense (DOD or Department) estab-
lished a sweeping voluntary disclosure program. In June 1986, a Blue Rib-
bon Presidential Commission on Defense Management chaired by David
Packard recommended that DOD place greater emphasis on contractor self-
governance.43 In July, in response to the "Packard Commission" Report,
DOD announced the adoption of policies to encourage DOD contractors to
disclose voluntarily problems involving contractual relationships with the
Department."
DOD's program is popular with defense contractors.45 The program has
become quite formalized, to the point where the Department has developed
a standard voluntary disclosure agreement (XYZ Agreement).46 Among
other things, the agreement emphasizes that any corporate disclosure is vol-
untary. A corporation making a disclosure is not required to conduct an
41. See Discovery, supra note 40, at 1167.
42. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 801; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward
a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv.
1099, 1102-03, 1116-17 (1977).
43. PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, A QUEST FOR
EXCELLENCE, 101, 110-11 (1986).
44. Letter from William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Jul. 24, 1986), re-
printed in VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, A REPORT BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON VOLUN-
TARY DISCLOSURE, AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW, Exhibit 3 (1987)
[hereinafter VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE]. Rules and regulations governing DOD's voluntary
disclosure program appear in 48 C.F.R. §§ 203.7000, 209.406-1, 252.203-7003 (1989).
45. As of October 1, 1990, 89 different corporations had made a total of 209 disclosures.
Data provided by William A. Kimetz, Voluntary Disclosure Program Manager, Office of the
Assistant Inspector General for Criminal Investigations Policy and Oversight, DOD (Oct. 12,
1990) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review).
46. Agreement Between XYZ Company and the Office of the Inspector General, Depart-
ment of Defense, Revised 5/5/89 [hereinafter XYZ Agreeement], attached to a letter from
Morris B. Silverstein, Assistant Inspector General for Criminal Investigations Policy and
Oversight to Mr. Frank H. Menaker, Jr., Chairman Special Committee on Voluntary Disclo-
sure, ABA Section on Public Contract Law (May 8, 1989) [hereinafter Silverstein Letter].
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internal investigation or to file a formal report with DOD.47 If a corporation
conducts an internal investigation and submits a written report to the De-
partment, however, the report must be complete and accurate.48 The report
must describe the investigation conducted, identify files, documents, and
records reviewed, identify all individuals interviewed, summarize any sup-
porting audit activity, and describe the facts that were found.49 The XYZ
Agreement makes it clear that any report or other information disclosed by
the corporation is subject to verification, audit, and investigation by the
Department.50
There is a significant incentive for government contractors with DOD
contractual problems to participate in the program, because a felony convic-
tion can result in debarment for up to three years.5" Although DOD has
reserved the right to refer appropriate matters to the Department of Justice
for investigation and civil or criminal prosecution, 2 DOD has promised that
any determinations it might make with respect to suspension or debarment
will consider the "contractor's achievements in ensuring corporate integ-
rity."53 Not surprisingly, DOD views participation in its voluntary disclo-
sure program as one indication of integrity and meaningful self-
governance. 54
If the agency has a formal voluntary disclosure program in place, the cor-
poration should carefully review the rules and regulations governing the pro-
gram before making any disclosure. Such rules and regulations may control
47. XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part A, para. 1.
48. The corporation's interests will be severely prejudiced if the agency concludes that the
corporation failed to conduct, or to completely and accurately report on, any investigation
initiated. Moreover, if a court finds that the corporation's voluntary disclosure was selective or
was for the purpose of furthering some improper scheme, the court will imply a waiver of any
otherwise applicable privileges. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re
John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977);
49. XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part A, paras. 3 and 5.
50. Id. Part A, para. 9.
51. 48 C.F.R. § 209.406-4 (1989).
52. XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part A, paras. 7-8. The Department of Justice has
provided U.S. Attorneys with Justice Department Guidelines regarding DOD's voluntary dis-
closure program. See Memorandum from William C. Hendricks III, Chief, Fraud Section,
Criminal Division, to United States Attorneys (Jul. 17, 1987), VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE,
supra note 44, Exhibit 9.
53. Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV to defense contractors
(Aug. 10, 1987), VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, supra note 44, Exhibit 4.
54. As stated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft, it is the DOD's view that:
early voluntary disclosure, coupled with full cooperation and complete access to nec-
essary records, are strong indications of an attitude of contractor integrity even in the
wake of disclosures of potential criminal liability. We will consider such cooperation
as an important factor in any decisions that the Department takes in the matter.
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, supra note 44, Exhibit 3.
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such critical issues as: (1) the extent of the disclosure required; (2) whether
or not the corporation will have to provide or make available documents,
including counsel's final report to management, to the agency; and (3) the
extent to which the agency may share copies of the report and supporting
documents with other agencies or third parties. These and other issues
should be thoroughly discussed with the agency before any voluntary disclo-
sure is made, particularly if corporate interests could be harmed if docu-
ments prepared during the investigation were to fall into the wrong hands.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING A VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
When a corporation elects to make a voluntary disclosure to a federal
agency it is likely to be the beginning of a protracted process. The obvious
purpose of the disclosure is to facilitate the resolution of issues identified
during the investigation. Third parties, however, may also have an interest
in the subject matter of the investigation as well as in documents created
during the investigation. As a consequence, a corporation must give careful
consideration to all possible effects of a disclosure, including those that reach
beyond the corporation's immediate relationship with the contracting
agency.
A. Which Documents, if any, Will Have to be Provided to the Affected
Federal Agency?
It is important to determine which documents generated during the cor-
poration's internal investigation might have to be provided to the affected
agency. Under DOD's voluntary disclosure program, a corporation can
make a voluntary disclosure without providing the agency with a written
report of the corporation's internal investigation. If counsel has prepared a
report for management, however, it is likely that the agency will request a
copy. 55 The agency may insist upon receiving audit reports or other docu-
ments pertaining to the investigation as well.
56
In establishing their respective voluntary disclosure programs, both the
SEC and DOD reserved the right to ask for additional information from
55. Because the agency will likely want a copy of the report prepared for management,
care must be exercised in drafting the report. To avoid waiver of privilege issues, the report
must provide a full and complete description of the irregularities identified during the investi-
gation. It may be possible, however, to restrict details that could be particularly damaging if
discovered by third parties to an internal report prepared by counsel in anticipation of possible
future litigation. The agency should have no need for such attorney work product if the report
submitted by the corporation is complete and subject to independent verification. Neverthe-
less, the corporation should thoroughly discuss the wisdom of preparing a separate report in
anticipation of litigation.
56. See XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part A, para. 5(A)(2).
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companies making voluntary disclosures. In the SEC's case, the Commis-
sion insisted on a right of access to all materials underlying the internal in-
vestigation. As the court noted in In re Sealed Case."57
SEC access to corporate records concerning the matters under
investigation was a logical, even necessary, feature of the voluntary
disclosure program. No corporation could have reasonably ex-
pected to submit a report to the SEC and receive lenient treatment
in return unless the SEC could check the accuracy of the report.
Similarly, a voluntary disclosure to DOD is subject to verification and au-
dit,5" and the standard XYZ Agreement preserves the Department's right to
request supplemental information. 9 A corporation may decline to provide
additional information, but such a declination may adversely affect the gov-
ernment's assessment of the corporation's willingness to cooperate.'
For the reasons discussed in Part VI, documents that are physically pro-
vided to an agency are much more likely to find their way into the hands of
third parties than those retained by the corporation. As a consequence,
before the corporation makes a voluntary disclosure and provides documents
to the agency, an attempt should be made to limit the number of documents
that have to be provided to the agency.
. The Need for a Voluntary Disclosure Agreement
Once the corporation decides voluntarily to disclose information, the first
step is to discuss the corporation's intent with the agency and to negotiate a
voluntary disclosure agreement. The agreement should specify which docu-
ments, if any, the corporation will have to provide in support of its voluntary
disclosure. The corporation should try to persuade agency officials that a
report of the investigation prepared by the corporation or by counsel on be-
half of the corporation should be sufficient to meet the agency's needs. The
agency is likely to insist on a right to ask for supplemental information or
additional documents. While a provision to this effect is reasonable, an at-
tempt should be made to resist open-ended commitments that could obligate
57. 676 F.2d 793, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
58. XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part A, para. 9.
59. Id. Part A, para. 5(B). If the agency concludes that it needs to examine other docu-
ments, in addition to the investigation report, to verify the accuracy of representations made,
the corporation should grant the agency access to the necessary documents rather than provide
copies. Obviously, third parties may find it more difficult to obtain copies of documents that
are not within the agency's possession, custody, or control.
60. Id. at Part A, para. 5(C).
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the corporation to provide or to make available to the agency all documents
generated during the internal investigation.61
The voluntary disclosure agreement should also clearly state what the
agency's response will be if another agency or a private party attempts to
obtain copies of the investigation report or any other documents provided to
the agency. The agency should be willing to resist requests for such docu-
ments under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).62 It should also be
willing to provide the corporation with advance notice before furnishing a
copy of the report or other documents to another federal agency.6 a
Language preserving the applicability of the attorney-client and work
product privileges is critical and should be included in the voluntary disclo-
sure agreement. For example, the agreement should include provisions:
1. reflecting the corporation's belief that the attorney-client and
work product privileges apply to all documents generated during the
course of the internal investigation;
2. reserving to the corporation the right to assert the privileges in
subsequent proceedings involving the agency or third parties;
61
3. providing that the production of the report and other documents
pertaining to the corporation's internal investigation to the agency will
not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege with respect to third
parties;
65
61. At least one court has suggested that "there is no significance to the distinction be-
tween full access and physical possession" regarding disclosure of materials to an agency. In
re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1984). If that is the case, a
litigation opponent will have broadened opportunities to argue waiver of privilege.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); see XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part C, para. 1; see also
ISC Group, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 35 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 75,667 (D.C.
Cir. May 22, 1989) (discussed in Part VI(B)).
63. Some agencies have a policy of offering qualified confidentiality. The Federal Trade
Commission generally tries to provide ten days notice before disclosing information. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118 (D.D.C. 1977).
64. DOD's XYZ Agreement specifically acknowledges that "the attorney-client privilege
and the attorney work product privilege may attach to certain information, documents, com-
munications, and notes, memoranda, recordings, or detailed descriptions of interviews,
whether or not voluntarily submitted in connection with this disclosure or in connection with
the submission of any of the supplemental information." XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part
A, para. 6. At the same time, the government "reserves the right to agree or disagree with the
asserted applicability" of any privilege. Id. Thus, the practical effect of the XYZ Agreement
is to defer disputes over privilege to a later date.
65. A court, depending on the facts before it, could reach a different conclusion. A
number of cases, however, have emphasized the importance of continuing to assert the privi-
lege to avoid an implied waiver. See Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal.




4. requiring the agency to file and otherwise handle the documents
in a manner that is consistent with the corporation's belief that the at-
torney-client and work product privileges apply to corporate documents
held by the agency; and
5. providing for the return of the documents to the corporation
when the agency has completed its review and the underlying issues are
resolved.66
If the agency is unwilling to provide reasonable protection for the corpora-
tion's report, or is insensitive to the corporation's need to include language
that may prevent a waiver of the attorney-client and work product privi-
leges, the corporation may wish to reconsider its options.
VI. THE IMPACT OF MAKING A VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE ON THE
ABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES TO GAIN ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
GENERATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE
INVESTIGATION
Before making a voluntary disclosure and providing a report to a federal
agency, the corporation should carefully consider the impact disclosure is
likely to have on the corporation's ability to protect information developed
during the investigation from (1) other federal and state agencies, (2) the
Congress, and (3) competitors, employees, and other private parties. The
corporation must also determine whether disclosure risks exposing only
those documents filed with the agency, or additional materials associated
with the investigation, including internal correspondence, questionnaires, in-
terview memoranda, and Executive Committee minutes reflecting discus-
sions with counsel relative to the investigation. The resolution of these
uncertainties will be influenced by a number of factors, including the rules
and regulations applicable to the agency's voluntary disclosure program, the
terms and conditions of the voluntary disclosure agreement, statutory con-
straints, the agency's rules regarding FOIA requests, and the rapidly evolv-
ing law with respect to "waiver" of privilege.
A. The Chances that Materials Provided to the Agency Will be Made
Available to Other Agencies or to Congress
A document provided to a federal agency under a voluntary disclosure
may be disseminated to other federal agencies. DOD's XYZ Agreement, for
example, specifically reserves to DOD the right to "transfer documents pro-
vided by the corporation to any department or agency within the Executive
66. See XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part C, para. 3.
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Branch if the information relates to matters within the organization's juris-
diction."67 Moreover, many federal agencies, as a matter of policy or com-
ity, will share documents with other federal agencies6 and sometimes with
state agencies as well.69 In addition, a number of federal agencies are subject
to statutes that mandate information sharing with other agencies.7° Con-
gressional committees may also be able to obtain copies of the report and
other documents submitted to the agency.71
Because documents provided to a federal agency are frequently made
available to other agencies, a corporation making a voluntary disclosure
should seek assurances from the agency that none of the corporation's docu-
ments will be released, even to other federal agencies or Congress, unless the
agency provides advance notice to the corporation. 72 At the very least, ad-
vance notice affords a corporation the opportunity to seek appropriate com-
mitments and assurances from the agency receiving copies of the documents
and, if such assurances and commitments are not forthcoming, to seek judi-
cial relief.73 Without advance notice, the risk of leaks or disclosures in re-
sponse to FOIA requests increases. Equally important, secondary
67. Id. Part C, para. 2.
68. The SEC's Manual of Administrative Regulations "encourages the disclosure of non
public information to other federal law enforcement officials." United States v. Fields, 592
F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979) (emphasis omitted). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) has maintained a similar policy for years. That policy was
codified in the 1980 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1988).
69. See Fleming v. FTC, 670 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC,
475 F. Supp. 338 (D.D.C. 1979).
70. E.g., 44 U.S.C. § 3510(a) (1988) (authorizes agencies to "make available to another
agency.... information obtained pursuant to an information collection request"); see also 15
U.S.C. § 57b-2(b)(6) (1988) (FTC custodian of documents may make such documents avail-
able to federal and state law enforcement agencies); 15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1988) (permits
sharing of documents between Department of Justice (DOJ) and FTC); 16 U.S.C. § 797(c)
(1988) (federal agencies "authorized and directed" to furnish "records, papers, and informa-
tion" to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 22 U.S.C. § 2575 (1988) (providing for
information exchanges between the United States Information Agency (USIA), DOD and
other agencies).
71. See generally FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118, 1125 (D.D.C. 1977). Materials in
the hands of Congressional committees are even more difficult to protect from subsequent
disclosure. As one court noted, "[W]hen... information is in the possession of an agency in
the Executive Branch, and is requested on behalf of the Congress from the agency, the risk [of
disclosure] is considerably increased." Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 600 n.13 (D.N.J.
1978); see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Ashland Oil, Inc. V. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 308 n.14 (D.D.C. 1976).
72. See generally FTC v. Texaco Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 883-85 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(FTC required to give corporation 10 days notice before disclosing documents which the com-
pany designated as confidential); FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118 (D.D.C. 1977) (FTC
required to provide 10 days notice, or such notice which is feasible under the circumstances,
before disclosing corporate documents).
73. See supra note 70.
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recipients, including other federal agencies, could use the corporation's doc-
uments for some inappropriate purpose. In the absence of notice, the corpo-
ration would not have an opportunity either to object or to prepare itself for
involvement in some other proceeding.
B. The Chances That Nongovernmental Third Parties Will be Able to
Obtain Copies of Documents Generated During the Course of the
Internal Investigation
This issue involves two categories of documents: those voluntarily dis-
closed to the agency and those generated during the internal investigation,
but not provided to the agency.
The first category, those provided to the agency, raises practical as well as
legal issues. As discussed above, the risk that the corporation's report and
supporting documents may be leaked to a third party increases if the affected
agency provides copies to other agencies or to Congress. As a practical mat-
ter, once documents are handed over to a federal agency, effective control
over the material is lost. Nevertheless, the corporation can minimize the
risk of disclosure through leaks or inadvertence, if the voluntary disclosure
agreement includes provisions that will: (1) sensitize the agency to the cor-
poration's concerns; (2) require the agency to file and otherwise handle the
documents in a manner consistent with their confidential nature; and (3)
require the agency to provide the corporation with reasonable notice before
the documents are shared with other agencies.
The corporation should also be prepared to confront the possibility that
an interested third party may try to obtain the report or other documents by
making a FOIA request. Before making a voluntary disclosure, the agency's
rules and regulations relating to FOIA requests should be reviewed. Some
agencies broadly construe their disclosure obligations under FOIA. Others
take a more restrictive view. In any event, the voluntary disclosure agree-
ment should address this important issue. The agreement should reflect, as
the current DOD agreement does, the agency's willingness to treat informa-
tion obtained pursuant to the agreement as confidential. The agreement
should also state, as explicitly as possible, the agency's agreement not to
release the report or supporting documents to third parties pursuant to a
FOIA request. 4 At the very least, the agreement should provide that, if the
74. The XYZ Agreement provides that "[to the extent permitted by law and regulations,
[documents] will not be released by the Department of Defense to the public pursuant to a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request." XYZ Agreement, supra note 46, Part C, para.
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agency is required to comply with a FOIA request for the documents, the
agency will provide advance notice to the corporation. 7
There are several additional precautions that the corporation should take
to minimize the likelihood that documents provided to a federal agency pur-
suant to a voluntary disclosure agreement will be disclosed pursuant to a
FOIA request. Assuming there is a reasonable basis for doing so, the corpo-
ration should stamp the report itself and any supporting documents as
follows:
This document contains commercial or financial information which is
privileged and confidential and is protected from disclosure pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). It also contains information compiled for law en-
forcement purposes and is protected from disclosure pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).
Subsequently, when the corporation provides documents to the agency, it
should include a cover letter reminding the agency that the documents con-
tain confidential, proprietary, and law enforcement information, and that the
documents should not, in the corporation's view, be disclosed to third parties
submitting FOIA requests.
A recent case decided by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia provides hope that FOIA will not prove to be a useful tool to
third parties seeking access to reports of internal corporate investigations.
In ISC Group, Inc. v. Department of Defense, the court held that an internal
investigation report voluntarily provided to DOD was exempt from disclo-
sure under FOIA because the report contained confidential commercial or
financial information within the meaning of section 552(b)(4).76 The court
concluded that the report was "confidential" notwithstanding the corpora-
tion's disclosure to the Department of Defense because:
[T]he report at issue was submitted under DOD's voluntary disclo-
sure program, which was adopted in 1986 to encourage defense
contractors to establish a program of self-governance and volun-
tary disclosure .... Disclosure of information submitted under a
confidentiality agreement could undermine the ability of the gov-
ernment to obtain such information. This would jeopardize the ef-
75. DOD's rules provide for prior notice. 32 C.F.R. § 286.27(h)(1)(1988); see also Exec.
Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552 at 447 (1988) (requiring all
executive departments and agencies subject to FOIA to make good faith efforts to provide
advance notice of any proposed disclosure of confidential commercial information). If neces-
sary, the corporation can file suit to block a proposed release under FOIA. See Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285, 317-18 (1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325,
337 (D.C. Cir. 1989); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1133-34 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
76. 35 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 75,667 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1989).
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fectiveness of the voluntary disclosure program and the ability of
DOD to police its contracts with private companies. From a
broader perspective, disclosure of such information would raise se-
rious questions about the integrity of the government in promising
confidentiality to future submitters.77
The court also found the report exempt from disclosure pursuant to section
552(b)(7) because the agency was using the report for law enforcement pur-
poses. The court explained:
[The] investigative report was prepared with the express intent to
provide it to DOD [Inspector General] for use in investigating al-
leged criminal violations-to determine what had occurred and
who was responsible. The report was compiled after DOD learned
of the alleged cost mischarging, and it was prepared with the ap-
proval of DOD [Inspector General]. Further, the information in
the report is being used to determine whether [the corporation] or
others involved, should be prosecuted. In light of these circum-
stances, it is clear that the report was compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes, despite the fact that it was prepared by a private
company. To conclude otherwise would elevate form over sub-
stance and frustrate the purpose of the exemption.78
If a third party is unable to obtain a copy of the report pursuant to a
FOIA request or otherwise, it might try to obtain the denied information by
filing suit against the corporation and pursuing discovery. In this situation,
the third party will undoubtedly claim that the corporation's production of
documents to the agency waived any privilege which might otherwise have
protected the documents from discovery.
As a general rule, the corporation will be deemed to have waived the at-
torney-client privilege if a privileged communication is disclosed to persons
not included in the privileged relationship. 79 An intent to waive the privi-
lege is not required."0 Once waived, the privilege is waived for all pur-
poses.8 Disclosures may also waive the work product privilege, although
some courts have been willing to recognize a "limited waiver," in which the
privilege will be considered waived, but only with respect to the person to
77. Id. at 82,672.
78. Id. at 82,673.
79. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. American Tel.
& Tel., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
80. See, e.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332
(N.D. Ga. 1980).
81. See, e.g., In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984); Permian Corp., 665 F.2d 1214, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
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whom the disclosure was made. For example, MCI's willingness to share
certain documents with the Department of Justice for possible use in an anti-
trust suit against AT&T did not preclude MCI from asserting the work
product privilege against AT&T in another proceeding.82 As the court in
United States v. AT&T explained: "The purpose of the work product doc-
trine is to protect information against opposing parties, rather than against
all others outside a particular confidential relationship .... A disclosure...
not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents shall be allowed
without waiver of the privilege."' 3 The "limited waiver" concept has also
been embraced by some courts that have considered the impact on the attor-
ney-client privilege of a disclosure voluntarily made to a federal agency fol-
lowing an internal investigation, even though the federal agency's interests
were not the same as those of the corporation.
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that documents provided voluntarily to the
SEC were not discoverable by a party in subsequent litigation because:
As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and non-
public SEC investigation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of
the privilege occurred. To hold otherwise may have the effect of
thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ in-
dependent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order
to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.8 4
Unfortunately, a number of other courts have expressly rejected Diversified
Industries' "limited waiver" approach.8" In Permian Corporation v. United
States, 8 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the disclosure of certain attorney-client communications to
the staff of the SEC waived the attorney-client privilege. The court stated,
"[w]e believe that the attorney-client privilege should be available only at the
traditional price: A litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must main-
tain genuine confidentiality." 87 The United States Court of Appeals for the
82. American Tel. d Tel., 642 F.2d at 1299.
83. Id.; accord In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982); GAF Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976).
84. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 611; accord Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
86. 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1222. In In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the D.C.
Circuit reiterated its rejection of Diversified Industries' "limited waiver" approach. The court's
finding of an implied waiver in Sealed Case was heavily influenced by its conclusion that the
corporation had failed to make a full and complete disclosure and was thus trying to manipu-
late the privilege. Id. at 824-25.
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Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in In re Martin Marietta 8 8 In
Martin Marietta, the court permitted a former employee indicted for mail
fraud to discover audit papers, witness statements, administrative settlement
agreement materials, and other documents associated with an internal inves-
tigation because the corporation had provided the documents or underlying
data to the government during negotiations for an administrative settlement
agreement. The court reasoned that, because the materials had been "pub-
lished," they no longer enjoyed the protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege.8 9
Other courts have suggested a "middle ground" between Diversified In-
dustries and the conclusions reached by the Fourth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit in Martin Marietta and Permian. In Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co.,90 a third party attempted to compel
Teachers to produce certain documents that the corporation had turned over
to the SEC pursuant to a subpoena. After reviewing a number of cases, the
court concluded that a voluntary disclosure of documents to an agency
would waive the attorney-client privilege completely "unless the right to as-
sert the privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the
time disclosure is made."91
In light of these cases, a corporation should not voluntarily provide docu-
ments pertaining to the corporation's internal investigation to a federal
agency without attempting to include in the voluntary disclosure agreement
acknowledgement of an intent to preserve the attorney-client and work
product privileges, at least with respect to third parties. Failure to reach an
agreement on this important point will greatly increase the likelihood that a
litigation opponent will be able to acquire, through discovery, not only docu-
ments provided to the agency, but other documents generated during the
internal investigation as well. 92
One other factor may significantly influence the decision of a court that is
trying to determine whether to imply a waiver of privilege when the only
breach of confidentiality has been the voluntary disclosure of a report and
supporting documents to a federal agency. That factor is "fairness". If the
court concludes that the corporation has not made a full and complete dis-
88. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 624.
90. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
91. Id. at 644-45; accord Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
92. See United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 757 F.2d 871 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir.
1984) (underlying details of published data not protected).
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closure, or is otherwise trying to secure benefits associated with a voluntary
disclosure while attempting to shield important facts or circumstances from
the agency, the court is likely to find an implied waiver of privilege. 93 As the
District of Columbia Circuit emphasized in In re Sealed Case:
The lawyer's work product privilege was conceived by lawyers
who succeeded in having lawyers-become-judges accept the idea.
The basis for that acceptance was that, while honesty, full disclo-
sure, and fair dealing are indispensable to justice, our judicial sys-
tem-an adversary system, in most instances-should function
more effectively where the work product of the lawyer is protected
from unnecessary disclosure. But here, the agreement to cooperate
with the SEC in determining the facts was intended to alter the
adversary relationship. Together the parties were to seek the truth.
Certainly, in such circumstances where lawyer and client attempt
to manipulate the work product privilege as Company and its
counsel have done in this case, the cause of justice compels disclo-
sure, and a waiver is implied.94
VII. CONCLUSION
For a host of legal, public policy, and self-governance reasons, internal
corporate investigations are likely to become increasingly common. Corpo-
rations initiating internal investigations should carefully structure them to
ensure that the attorney-client and work product privileges will protect from
discovery documents generated during the course of such investigations. If
an investigation reveals evidence of fraud or other serious wrongdoing, the
corporation should consider making a voluntary disclosure to the appropri-
ate government agency. Before any such disclosure is made, however, the
consequences of disclosure, including the impact of disclosure on the ability
of third parties to gain access to documents generated during the course of
the internal investigation, should be carefully considered.
A voluntary disclosure to a federal agency will not necessarily result in a
waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges, at least with re-
spect to third parties. Negotiating an acceptable voluntary disclosure agree-
ment with the agency prior to disclosure, however, is critical. Terms and
conditions should be included in the agreement to minimize the likelihood
93. See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re
John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (claim of privilege is not consistent with
selective disclosure); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("lim-
ited waiver may be inappropriate where unfairness would result"); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("[a]n important consideration in assessing
the issue of waiver is fairness").
94. 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that the corporation's voluntary disclosure will be deemed to be an express
or implied waiver of the attorney-client or work product privilege. If a satis-
factory agreement cannot be negotiated, third parties engaged in litigation
with the corporation may be able to gain access not only to disclosed mate-
rial, but to other documents generated during the course of the internal in-
vestigation as well.

